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ABSTRACT 
In this paper  a  supply of output model  is developed  and 
empirically tested for six EC-countries  (Belgium,  France, 
Germany,  Italy,  the Netherlands  and  the  U.K.)  during  the 
sample  period  1960-80.  We  study the  empirical  importance 
of inflationary surprise variables  on  the  supply of out-
put.  The  conclusion of this empirical analysis is that, 
at least during  the  seventies,  inflationary surprises  (as 
measured  by  a  time-series  procedure or based  on  the EC-
survey)  were  insignificant in most  countries. 
We  also tested for  the  empirical  importance of  the  terms 
of  trade and  taxation variables  in the  supply of output 
equations.  It is  found  that  the  (intermediate good) 
terms  of trade had  a  significant negative effect on 
output  in most  EC-countries.  The  empirical evidence 
about  the effect of  taxation is mixed. I 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
European countries have  been  subjected to substantial  shocks  during  the 
seventies.  One  was  the oil shock which  occured  twice  (1973-1977  and  1979-
1980)  and  which  dramatically worsened  the  terms  of  trade of most  European 
countries.  Another  "shock" was  introduced  in a  more  gradual  way  and  was 
the result of  a  large  increase of  taxation of  labor  income  (income  taxes 
and  social security contributions)  during  the  same  period. 
Table  I  illustrates the size of  these  two  shocks  relative to GDP.  The 
first column  gives  the  increase of  income  taxes  and  social security con-
tribution as  a  percentage of  GDP  for  the  industrialised countries,  and  the 
second  column  is  the  increased value of oil  imports  also expressed  as  a 
percentage of GDP.  The  latter figure  is used  as  a  broad  indication of  the 
OPEC-imposed  increase of  taxation of oil.  The  table illustrates that both 
supply shocks  have  been substantial.  It also indicates  that  the  (self-im-
posed)  labor  tax shock has  been  larger in most  OECD-countries  than  the  (ex-
ternally imposed)  oil shock.  This  is especially true for  the  small Euro-
pean oil importers where  during  1970-1980  taxation on  labor has  increased 
by 5.8 percentage points of  GDP  whereas  the  increased oil tax  (measured  by 
the  increased value of  imports)  was  3.8 % of  GDP. 
Most  of  the theoretical and  empirical  research on  the macro-economic  ef-
fects  of  these supply  shocks  has  concentrated on  the effects of  the oil 
price shocks.  Noteworthy here are the studies of  Bruno  and  Sachs  (1979), 
and  (1982)  and  Giavazzi  and  Wyplosz  (1981).  Relatively little has  been 
done  to measure  the macro-economic  implications  of  the  second  supply  shock. 
The  purpose of this study is to present  the results of  the estimation of 
supply of output  equations  for  six EC-countries.  The  underlying theoreti-
cal framework  is the Lucas  supply of output  equations  extended  to  an  open 
economy.  The  extension as  developed by Fratianni and  Nabli  (1981)  will be 
used,  and  applied  to quarterly data.  The  salient features  of  this open-
economy-supply-of-output  equations  is that it incorporates  terms-of-trade 
effects and  labor tax effects.  This will allow one  to draw  some  (tenta-
tive)  conclusions  as  to  the relative importance  of  the  two  supply shocks - 4  -
Table  Increase in taxation of  labor  and oil as  a  percent of  GDP  from 
1970  to  1980 
Labor  Oil 
EUROPEAN  OIL  IMPORTERS  : 
Austria  6.3  2.7 
Belgium  7.8  5.5 
Denmark  2.9  3.0 
Finland  1.9  5.7 
France  2.8 
Germany  5. 1  3.0 
Ireland  9.2  5.6 
Italy  4.6  3.3 
Netherlands  5. 1  4. 1 
Sweden  8.3  4.4 
Switzerland  7.0  2.2 
Average  5.8  3.8 
Standard deviation  2.3  1 • 3 
OTHER  INDUSTRIALISED  COUNTRIES  : 
Canada  1 • 2 .  1 • 7 
Japan  5.4  4.2 
U.K.  -0.2  0.8 
u.s.  3.0  2.7 
AVERAGE  (ALL  COUNTRIES)  4.6  3.4 
NOTE  The  first column  (labor)  represents  the  increase in income  tax and 
social security contribution in percentage points of  GDP;  the  se-
cond  column  represents  the  increased value of oil imports  as  a  per-
cent of GDP.  For  countries  that produce  domestic oil  (Canada,  U.K., 
U.S.)  the  increased value of oil imports is a  bad proxy  for  the  in-
creased OPEC  induced  tax on oil. 
SOURCES  :  IMF,  International Financial Statistics,  for oil;  OECD  Long  Term 
trends in tax revenues  of  OECD  member  countries,  Studies  in 
taxation,  1  98 1  ,  p •  1  4 • - 5  -
of  the  seventies in affecting long-term output in EC-countries.  In addi-
tion,  the Fratianni-Nabli extension of  the  supply of  output equations  in-
troduces  institutional features  such as wage  indexation.  (See  also Mar-
ston  (1981)  on  this).  These are particularly important in many  EC-coun-
tries.  Its existence affects  the  specification and  estimatio~ of supply-
of-output equations. 
Price expectations play an  important role  in supply-of-output equations. 
Two  alternative strategies will be  followed  here.  In a  first part,  the 
supply of output equations will be estimated using  a  procedure based  on 
time  series analysis.  In a  second part,  the EC-survey-based  inflationary 
expectations variable will  be  used  in the estimation of  the  supply-of-out-
put equations.  Finally,  strong tests of rationality of  this EC-inflatio-
nary expectations  series will be  performed. - 6  -
II.  THE  THEORETICAL  FRAMEWORK 
This  section makes  extensive use  of  the  theoretical  sections in Fratianni 
and  Nabli  (1982)  1  •  In order  to derive  the  supply-of-output equations 
the  following ,building blocks are used  : 
- a  production function; 
- a  demand  and  supply function of  labor determining  the equilibrium in the 
labor market; 
- a  rational expectations  formation assumption. 
The  demand  and  supply for  labor equations  together with the production 
function allow to derive  a  supply-of-output equation in the  following 
way 
The  production function is written as 
(1) 
where  Y is domestic output,  N is labor and  H is an  imported  intermediate 
input.  Firms maximise 
(2) 
where  Pd  and  Ph  are  the prices of Y and  H;  W is  the nominal  wage  rate, 
t 1  is the  tax on wages  in the  form of  social security contributions paid 
by  the employers.  The  value of  the parameter o 1  indicates how  the  firm 
values  government  services  (including subsidies)  generated by  the  tax. 
When  o1 = 0  there is no  tax wedge  problem;  when  o1 = 1  the wedge  problem 
is complete.  From  the first order maximisation condition one  can derive 
the demand  schedules of  the  two  inputs,  labor and  the  intermediate  (impor-
ted)  good  (expressed in logs)  : 
(3) 
For more  detail  see Fratianni  & Nabli  {1982),  pp.  4-8.  In the next  sec-
tion a  graphical interpretation of  the model  is presented. - 7  -
n  = IU  +  b2  (pd  - w)  +  a2  (pd  - ph)  - b2  °1  Tl  (4) 
where  pd  = the price of  the  domestic  good  in log 
ph  =  the price of  the  imported  intermediate good  in log 
w  =  the nominal  wage  rate in log 
at  a 1  I (I  - a. 1  - 0.2)  > 0 
a2  =  a.21 (I -a  - 0.2)  > 0  1 
bl  =  ( 1  - a.l)l(l  - a.  - 0.2)  > 0  I 
b2  =  (I  - a.2) I< 1 - a.  - 0.2)  > 0  1 
TI  =  log  (I  +  ti) 
Equation  (4)  is the  labor demand  equation.  The  demand  for  labor increases 
when  real wages  decline,  when  the  terms  of  trade  (pd  - ph)  increase  and 
when  the  tax wedge  (TI)  declines.  Note  that if firms  attach  the  same  value 
to  the  services provided by  the.goverment  as  to  the  labor  taxes  they pay, 
OI  = 0,  and  the  tax variable diasappears  from equations  (3)  and  (4).  The 
wage  setting behavior  (the  supply of  labor services)  is assumed  to  take 
the  following  form  : 
where  p  '.  is  the  aggregate price  index,  and 
t 
(5) 
E  pt is the price in period  t 
t-1 
expected in period t-I;  T2  is  the  tax wedge;  i.e.  T2  = log(I+t2) 
where  t 2 
=  the  income  tax paid by workers. 
Labor contracts are negociated at the  end  of period  t  - I  at which  time 
workers make  their best forecast  concerning  the overall price level for 
period t.  In addition,  workers  may  bargain for  indexation clauses which 
will insulate  them  from  the effects of forecast errors in the general 
price level.  The  degree  of  indexation is reflected in the value of 
b  (0 ~ b  ~ 1);  when  b  = 1  there is complete wage  indexing and nominal 
wages  adjust completely  to  changes  in the current aggregate price index. - 8  -
Finally workers  may  seek higher nominal wages  the higher the  level of 
taxes  on wage  income.  The  parameter o 2  expresses  the valuation by  workers 
of government  provided services  (including transfers)  relative to  taxes 
paid.  The  term o 2T2  is to be  interpreted as  a  tax push  on  the supply side 
of the labor market.  Here  also,  if workers  value  government  services  (in-
cluding transfers)  as  equal  to  the  tax  they pay,  o 2  = 0,  and  workers will 
not  seek to  increase their gross  wage  claims.  The  aggregated price index 
pt is defined as  : 
{6) 
where Pf,t is the  (domestic  currency)  price of  the foreign good  used  in 
the consumption basket of domestic workers;  (pf  = pxf  +  s;  where  pxf 
't  't 
is the foreign currency price of  the foreign good  and  s  is the exchange 
rate);  A is the share of  the domestic  good  in the  consumption basket. 
Combining  {1),  (3),  (4),  {5)  and  (6)  allows  to derive  the aggregate  sup-
ply function 
(7) 
This  is a  Lucas-type aggregate  supply function  extended  to an  open  economy. 
The  term a1Tt measures  the effect of  the total tax wedge  (income  tax+ so-
cial contribution)  to  the  supply of output.  This  effect is negative.  The 
third term is the  inflationary "surprise" effect.  Its importance  in the 
supply of output equation depends  on  the degree of wage  indexation.  With 
partial indexation the role of  the inflationary surprises is reduced. 
With  complete wage  indexation  (b  = 1), it drops  out altogether from  the 
equation.  The  supply of output  then only depends  on  relative prices  and 
the tax wedge.  The  last two  terms  measure  the termrof-trade effects on 
output.  A decline of  the final good  terms of  trade  (pd  - pf)  has  a  nega-
tive effect on  output.  An  increase in the relative price of  imported in-
termediate goods  (measured by  ph - pf)  has  a  negative effect on  output. - 9  -
In order to close the model  an aggregate demand  function is added 
where mt  = the nominal  money  stock 
Gt  = the fiscal  impulse variable 
The  first term measures  the  impact of  changes  in the real money  stock;  the 
third term measures  the effect of  a  real fiscal  impulse;  the  second  term 
is the  terms-of-trade effect on aggregate demand.  This  is negative because 
an  increase  in the price of  the domestic  good  relative  to  the foreign good 
reduces  aggregate  demand. 
Economic  agents  are assumed  to use all available  information  to forecast 
the future price level.  The  domestic price level is endogenously deter-
mined  by  the model.  Solving for pdt  and  taking expectatins yields  : 
I  E  pdt =- {- ao  +  ai  E  Tt +  si  E  mt 
t-I 
D  t-I  t-I 
+ [ai(l -A)+ (A- I)(SI  +  S3)  +  S21  E  Pf,t 
t-I 
+  a2  E  Pht  +  s3  E  Gt} 
t-1  t-1 
(9) 
where  D  is a  constant which  is a  combination of all parameters. 
This  expression also allows  to derive the unexpected price of  the domestic 
good  which  plays  a  role in the  aggregate  sypply equation  (7).  One  obtains  : 
I 
=-
D 
( IO) 
with ut = u  - u  d,t  s,t 
Thus  the unexpected  level of domestic  goods  prices depends  on  the unexpec-
ted components  of  the underlying  exogenous  variables. - 10  -
III.  THE  COMPARATIVE  STATICS  OF  THE  MODEL 
In this  section a  brief analysis of  the comparative statics of  the model 
is presented.  A graphical  representation of  the model  is used.  For  a  de-
tailed algebraic solution,  see Fratianni and  Nabli  (p.  8-11).  The  aggre-
gate  supply equation is represented by  the upward  sloping YS-curve;  t.he 
aggregate  demand  curve by  the downward  sloping YD-curve.  YN  represents 
the  "normal"  output,  i.e.  the  level  of output which depends  on  the  tax 
wedge  and  the  terms  of  trade.  It is obtained by  setting E pt = pt in the 
supply of  output  equation  (7). 
Figure 
We  now  analyse  the effects of  several  exogenous  disturbances.  First,  ~ 
deterioration of  the  intermediate  terms  of  trade ph - pf.  This  shock is 
shown  by  an upward  shift of  the Y8-curve  to  Y~.  The  aggregate  demand  ef-
fect will be deflationary,  because  the increased price level  tends  to  de-
flate real money  balances.  The  strength of  this effect also depends  on 
the policy reactions and  the degree  to which  the authorities  follow  an ac-
comodating monetary policy.  In figure  a  net deflationary demand  effect 
is represented by  the  shift of  YD  to  the left.  A new  equilibrium is reached 
in F  with a  permanently  lower  level of  "normal" output. - II -
An  increase in the  tax wedge  has  similar macroeconomic  effects as  a  dete-
rioration of  the  terms  of  trade.  The  supply curve is also shifted upwards. 
If the  increased labor tax rate is used  to  finance  transfers,  the demand 
effects are likely to be negligible as  the  reduced after tax income  is 
compensated by  increased transfers.  The  economy  moves  from E  to G (see 
figure  2). 
Figure  2 
y'  .s 
Here  also  the "normal"  output  level will decline permanently.  Note  that 
the  size of  this negative effect on  output depends  on  the utility workers 
and  firms  attach to goverment  services and  transfers relative  to  the dis-
utility of paying  taxes.  If the former  is low  the negative effect of  the 
taxation on  output will increase.  This point illustrates how  the degree 
of efficiency of  the public sector has direct implications for  the workings 
of  the private sector. 
Finally,  the effects of a  devaluation can be  analysed as  follows  (see fi-
gure 3).  A devaluation raises  the domestic currency price of  the  foreign 
good  {pf).  As  a  result,  through substitution effects  the aggregate demand 
is increased.  At  the  same  time  the  increased price level reduces  the real 
cash balances.  This  tends  to reduce aggregate demand.  We  assume  here  that 
the substitution effect dominates  the real cash balance effect so  that there - 12  -
Figure 3 
is a  net expansion in demand.  If the devaluation was  unanticipated  the  eco-
nomy  moves  from E  to H.  This positive output effect is due  to  the inflation 
surprise effect in the  supply of  output equation  :  the  stimulation to output 
comes  from  the fact  that workers  had not anticipated  the devaluation when 
they bargained for  their current wages.  As  a  result real wages  decline. 
A perfectly anticipated devaluation shifts the  supply curve  upwards,  because 
wage  earners have  adjusted their nominal  wages  to reflect the  (anticipated) 
devaluation.  As  a  result,  the  economy  moves  to  a  point like K.  The  net 
effect on  the output level is ambigous  here.  However,  if we  allow  the no-
minal money  stock  (m)  to  increase in the  same  proportion as  the price level 
(the real money  stock  (m-p)  is unchanged  in the aggregate  demand  equation) 
the effect of  the devaluation on  output is neutral.  This  can be  seen as 
follows.  The  condition for  a  permanent positive supply effect of  a  deva-
luation is that  the latter improves  the  terms  of  trade  (the  term pd  - pf 
must  increase in the  supply of  output equation  (7)  to increase  the  supply). 
However,  to increase aggregate  demand  permanently  (assuming  the real money 
stock  to be kept unchanged)  the  terms  of  trade  (pd  - pf)  should decline 
i.e.  the domestic  good  must  become  cheap  relative  to  the  foreign  good. I) 
- 13  -
Since in the new  equilibrium point  demand  must  equal  supply it follows 
that this can only be  achieved if the  terms  of  trade return to their 
initial level,  thereby bringing demand  and  supply of output also to their 
initial level.  Any  other outcome  would  lead  to  inequality between  demand 
and  supply.  For  example,  if the devaluation would  lead to  a  deterioration 
of  the  terms  of trade  {pd-pf  declines)  this would  lead to  excess  demand 
for  the domestic  good,  because aggregate  demand  increases  and  aggregate 
supply declines.  This  would  tend  to push  up  the  domestic price  level un-
til equilibrium between  demand  and  supply is restored. 
It is also interesting to analyse  the  implications of full wage  indexing. 
It can be  shown  that  in a  fully  indexed  economy  a  devaluation does  not 
affect  the  level of output.  The  supply of output  equation is only affec-
ted by  the  terms  of  trade variable and  the  tax wedge.  Thus,  the  supply 
of output can only  increase if the devaluation leads  to  an  improvement  in 
the  terms  of trade.  As  a  result,  the effects of  a  devaluation in a  com-
pletely indexed wage  system are  identical to  a  perfectly anticipated deva-
luation in a  rational expectations world. 
Finally,  complications  can be  added  which  have  relevance  to  some  EC-coun-
tries.  For  example,  if the  income  tax system is progressive and  if tax 
brackets are not  indexed,  a  devaluation will automatically  increase  the 
tax wedge,  because it increases  the price level  and  the nominal  wage.  As 
a  result,  in such an  institutional arrangement,  a  devaluation leads  to  an 
extra upward  shift of  the supply-curve,  and  the  level of nominal  output 
will be  permanently reduced. - 14  -
IV.  EXTENSION  OF  THE  MODEL 
The  previous discussion makes  abstraction from  the existence of  a  non-traded 
good  sector.  Even  in the  open  economies  that will be analysed empirically 
the non-traded goods  sector is large enough  (often 50  per cent or more  of 
total GDP)  to be  given serious attention.  The  aggregate price level now 
must  be  redefined  : 
(11) 
where  Po  = the  log of  the non-traded  good  price level 
A3  = the  share  of non-traded  goods  in the consumption basket. 
The  new  version of  the aggregate  supply function of  the  traded  goods  sec-
2 
tor becomes 
(12) 
There  is an additional  term,  the  internal  terms  of  trade  (p0  - pd)  in the 
supply of  output equation.  Its influence on  industrial output is negative, 
i.e.  an  increase  (decrease)  in the price of non-traded  goods  relative  to 
traded goods  lowers  (increases)  output  in the  traded-goods  sector. 
The  specification of  the  supply of  output equation  (12)  will be  used  in 
the estimations reported in the next  section. 
2 
See Fratianni & Nabli  (1982),  p.  26-27. - 15  -
V.  ESTIMATION  OF  THE  MODEL 
The  estimation procedure consists  in first,  generating  the price expectations 
using equation  (9).  To  generate expectations of the  exogenous  variables  in 
equation  (9),  simple  autoregressive  schemes  of order 6  (AR(6))  were  fitted 
by  OLS.  These  were  then substituted into  (9)  and  the equation was  estimated 
using observed inflation rates as  dependent variables.  The  fitted values  are 
interpreted as  the expected values.  Some  general  indications  on  the results 
are  shown  in appendix A.  The  next  step is to estimate the  supply equations. 
Two  alternative approaches  were  followed  here.  One  approach  uses  a  two-
stage-estimation procedure,  in which,  first,  the unexpected price component 
(p  - E  pt)  is regressed on  the unexpected parts of  the  exogenous  varia-
t  t-1 
bles  in equation  (10).  The  second  stage consists  in using  the fitted un-
expected price component,  (pt- Ept),  as  an  independent  variable  in the 
supply of output  equation. 
An  alternative,  one-stage-estimation procedure consists  in using  the diffe-
rence between  the observed inflation variable,  pt,  and  the expected infla-
tion variable  (  E  pt)  as  generated by  equation  (9),  directly into the 
t-1 
supply equation. 
The  results of  the estimation of the  supply of output  equation  (12)  for  the 
sample  period  1960-80  (quarterly data)  are  shown  in tables  2  and  3.  The  equa-
tions were  estimated with a  lagged dependent variable.  (In appendix D the 
supply of output  equations  are  reestimated using  less stringent restrictions 
on the  lag structure).  Seasonal  dummies  were  added  (but not  reported  in 
table 2)  because  the quarterly output data are heavily seasonally influenced. 
The  following  interpretation of  the results can be  given.  The  single stage 
estimation procedure  (table 2)  generally yields  results which  are more  in 
accordance with the prediction of  the theory than the  two  stage estimation 
procedure  (table 3).  The  inflation surprise variable  (~p- E~p)  in the one 
stage estimation procedure is correctly signed in all countries  except  in 
the U.K.  Statistical significance,  however,  is obtained only  in the Nether-
lands  and  Italy.  The  intermediate  (oil)  terms  of  trade  (ph  - pf)  has  the 
correct sign in all countries  and  is statistically significant  in Belgium, 
France  and  the Netherlands.  The  tax wedge  variable is significant only  in T
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the case of the U.K.  The  results with the other two  terms-of-trade varia-
bles are poor.  Only  in the  case of Belgium  and  the  U.K.  does  the final  goods 
terms  of  trade  (pd  - pf)  exhibit a  significant positive effect on  output. 
The  internal  terms  of  trade  (p
0 
- pd)  has  a  significant negative effect  on 
output in Belgium and  France. 
As  indicated earlier,  the quality of  the estimation results using  a  two-
stage-estimation procedure is lower  3  •  The  inflation surprise variable is 
only significantly positive in France,  and  has  an  incorrect sign in three 
out of six cases.  The  coefficient of  the  terms  of  trade variables  and  the 
tax wedge  variable are less affected by  this  two-stage  procedure. 
On  the whole  one  can state that  the results are mixed.  For  some  countries 
the theoretical predictions of the effects of inflation surprises,  terms  of 
trade changes  and  tax wedge  variables are confirmed.  However,  these three 
effects are usually not  confirmed  together in the different countries. 
In order to test for possible structural breaks  during  the  sample  period, 
the supply-of-output  equations were  estimated during  the seventies  separa-
tely.  Formal  tests of significance of the structural break in the estimated 
equations  (Chow  test)  are given.in table 5.  Two  tentative periods  for  the 
break are considered,  i.e.  1971  and  1973.  The  results  indicate that signi-
ficant  structural shifts in the coefficients of  the  supply of output  equa-
tions have  occured  since  1971  in Belgium,  France,  Germany  and  Italy,  and 
since  1973  in the Netherlands  and  in the U.K. 
Since the break is stronger for most  countries  in  1971  the results for  the 
sample  period  1971-80  are given in table 6.  We  also give the estimated re-
sults for  the period  1973-1980  in table 7  because  these estimates will be 
compared  with  the estimates obtained using  the EC-inflationary expectations 
variable for which data are available only since  1973. 
The  general  impression of  the  supply equations  obtained during  the seventies 
is that the estimated coefficients of  the terms-of-trade variables  have  more 
often the corr_ect  sign and  are significant in more  cases  than when  the model 
is estimated for  the whole  sample  period.  Also  the  tax wedge  variable in-
creases  in significance during  the  1973-80  period.  However,  the inflation 
surprise variable has  the wrong  sign in three out  of  six cases. 
3'  We  should point out a  limitation in these results.  The  estimated standard 
errors  in the  two  stage estimation are incorrect,  since we  have  estimated 
actually in two  steps,  and  in this case correction should be made  for 
the standard errors.  This has not  been done  for  the results presented. - 20  -
Table 5  Chow-test  (F-ratio)  for structural shift in coefficients 
since  1971 
since  1971  since  1973 
Belgium  4.22  3.58 
France  2.85  2.53 
Germany  2.33  2.05 
Italy  2.54  1.52 
Netherlands  I.  54  2. 12 
U.K.  0.96  2.73 
NOTE  The  F-ratio for rejecting the null-hypothesis of no  structural 
shift is  1.9 at a  probability level of  95  % (2.6 at probability 
level of  99  %). T
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VI.  THE  SUPPLY  OF  OUTPUT  EQUATIONS  USING  THE  EC  SURVEY  BASED  INFLATION 
EXPECTATIONS 
In this section the results of estimating  the  supply of output model  using 
the EC-survey based  inflationary expectations are reported.  Details of  the 
method  used  in constructing this series is given in Papadia  (1981).  The  in-
flationary surprise variable used  in the  supply of output  equation  (~p - E~p) 
is now  defined as  the difference between  the observed inflation in period  t 
and  the EC-inflation expectations for  the  same  period.  Thus  this variable 
represents  the forecast  error obtained with  the  EC  inflation expectations 
variable  4 • 
Comparing  these results with  the previous  results reported  in table  7  (which 
use  a  time-series  procedure  to estimate inflationary expectations)  one  can 
conclude that  the  two  methods  lead to estimates of  the  supply function with 
comparable statistical qualities.  The  inflation surprise variable is statis-
tically significant only in the case of Italy,  and  has  the wrong  sign in 
three out of six cases.  The  coefficients of  the other variables in the equa-
tions are affected very little. Thus,  one  can  conclude  that the evidence of 
a  significant inflationary surprise effect on  the  supply of output  is weak 
when  one  uses  the EC  inflationary expectations variable.  Note,  however,  that 
a  similar result is obtained when  one  uses  inflationary expectations varia-
bles based on  time series analysis  (TS-inflationary expectations variable). 
The  failure of both the EC-inflationary expectations variable and  of the TS-
expectations variable to yield significant inflation surprise effects  (Lucas-
effect)  in the  supply of output  during  the seventies  can be  interpreted in 
two  ways.  One  is that there is no  evidence of  a  Lucas  surprise effect in EC-
countries possibly because of strong wage  indexation.  A second  interpretation 
is that the price expectations as  they are measured,  do  not  represent the ex-
pectations adequately.  As  a  result,  the inflationary surprise variable con-
structed on  the basis of  the  EC  data or on  the basis of  time series analysis 
~oes not represent  the true inflationary surprises of  economic  agents. 
4 
It should be noted  that  the  EC  inflation expectations variable is a  one 
year forecast of inflation.  Since  the observations  used here are quar-
terly we  assumed  that these forecasts  made  by  the  individuals  surveyed 
are linear forecasts  over  the whole  year.  This  assumption allowed  us  to 
easily transform the one  year forecasts  to  forecasts  over one  quarter. T
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One  way  to test whether  this is the correct interpretation is to  analyze 
whether or not  these  inflationary expectations data incorporate readily 
available  information about variables  that affect future  inflation rates 
(e.g.  money  supply,  foreign prices,  exchange  rates  .•• ).  If it is found 
that these expectations series do  not reflect this  information one  can  con-
clude that they do  not measure  the state of  expectations correctly. 
Note  that we  continue  to assume  here that expectations  are  formed  rational-
ly.  Sceptics might  argue that a  failure of  the expectations data to re-
flect readily available  information  (if confirmed)  could also be  interpre-
ted as  evidence that expectations are not  formed  rationally.  We  will re-
turn to this  issue in the next  section. - 26  -
VII.  THE  EC-INFLATIONARY  EXPECTATIONS  VARIABLE  AND  RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS 
In this section we  ask the question whether  the EC-survey-based  inflatio-
nary expectations data are consistent with  the hypothesis  of rational ex-
pectations.  We  deal with  the  same  question concerning  the IS-inflationary 
expectations. 
One  can test for rationality of  the EC-data  in several ways.  One  test, 
usually called a  "weak"  test,  consists  in analyzing  the  time  series pat-
tern of  the forecasting error obtained  form  the EC-data.  A minimum  requi-
rement  of  rational expectations  formation  is that the forecasting error 
should not be  systematically related to its own  past and,  therefore,  should 
not be predictible from  its own  past.  Such  tests were  performed  by  Papadia 
(1981).  He  found  that  in low-inflation countries  (Belgium,  Netherlands, 
Germany  and  France)  the EC-inflationary expectations variable passed the 
weak  test of  rationality.  In the high-inflation countries,  however,  (Italy, 
Denmark,  U.K.)  the weak  test of  rationality was  not met.  See  also Batche-
lor  (1982). 
A second  way  to test for rationality consists  in relating the forecasting 
errors  to variables  that are readily available and  are known  to affect  the 
future  inflation rates. 
5  This  idea can be  formulated  as  follows  The  inflation rate in period  t 
is related to  the past  changes  of  the money  stock and  of  the foreign price 
level.  We  formalize  this as  follows  : 
n 
+  E  a.~m  .  + 
.  1  1  t-1 
1= 
n 
E  b.~pf t  . 
i=  1  1  '  -1 
+  v t  (13) 
Rational  expectations  implies  that  economic  agents  use all available infor-
mation at period  t  when  forecasting next  periods price level.  In particular 
economic  agents will use  the evidence  that  the price level  in period  t+1  is 
related to present  and  past money  and  foreign price variables.  Thus 
5 
n  n 
E  ~Pt+1 =  co  +  E  ci~mt+1-i +  L  ei~Pf,t+1-i +  vt+1  (14) 
t  i=1  i=1 
See Mishkin  (1981).  For  a  recent application in the foreign  exchange 
market  see,  P.  Hartley  (1982). - 27  -
A test of  rational expectations  then consists  in estimating the  two  equations 
(13)  and  (14)  separately,  and,  testing for  the equality of the coefficients 
i.e. rational expectations  implies  that a  = c, a.  =c.  and  b.  =e  .•  An 
0  0  ~  ~  ~  ~ 
alternative estimating approach  is found  by  deriving  the forecasting  error 
from  equation  (13)  and  (14).  This  yields 
n 
~pt+1 - E  ~pt+1 = (ao- co)  +  .E
1 
(ai- ci)  ~mt+1-i 
t  ~= 
n 
+ t:
1 
(bi - ei)  ~Pf,t+1-i +  ut+1  - vt+1  (15) 
Rational  expectations  implies  that a  regression of  the forecasting error 
(~pt+ 1  - E  ~pt+ 1
)  on  the money  stock and  foreign price series should yield 
t 
coefficients that are not significantly different from  zero. 
This  is the approach which is followed here.  The  forecasting error obtained 
from  the inflationary expectations  series is regressed on  readily available 
series of money  stock,  foreign prices  (including the exchange rate).  We 
also add  here  the series of non-tradable goods  prices.  The  result of  these 
estimations is shown  in table 9.  Table  9  also  shows  the F-test of  the  joint 
significance of  the coefficients of  the  lagged money  and  price series  (see 
last columm).  The  F-ratio exceeds  the critical value for  three out of  six 
countries  (Belgium,  Germany  and  Italy)  in the regression of  the EC-infla-
tionary expectations series,  whereas  the F-ratio exceeds  its critical value 
only in the Belgian case  in the regression of  the TS-inflationary expecta-
tions series.  Thus  in the case of  the EC-survey based  inflationary expec-
tations there is evidence that in three countries not all available infor-
mation is used  by  economic  agents. 
As  indicated earlier,  these results suggest  two  possible interpretations. 
One  interpretation is that the survey-based  inflationary expectations  do 
not reflect the true expectations of  economic  agents which are formed  ra-
tionally.  In this view the  survey-based  inflationary expectations data 
are defective  in reflecting the true market  expectations.  A second possible 
interpretation is that  economic  agents  do  not  form  expectations  in a  ratio-
nal way.  The  failure of  the EC-data on  inflationary expectations  to be - 28  -
consistent with  the rational expectations  assumption  then reflects the  lack 
of rationality of  economic  agents. 
The  empirical  tests provided here  do  not  allow  to discriminate between  the 
two  interpretations.  Nevertheless  we  tend  to  favor  the first interpretation 
for  the  following  reasons.  Although it may  be  true  that  the  average  indi-
vidual who  is surveyed  in  the  EC-data  does  not exhibit rational behavior, 
this does  not mean  that  the market  expectations  are  irrational.  One  central 
point of  rational expectations  theory is that  "not all market participants 
have  to be  rational in order for markets  to display rational expectations. 
As  long as unexploited profit opportunities are  eliminated by  some  parti-
cipants in a  ruarket,  the market will behave  as  though expectations  are  ra-
tional despite irrational participants in that market"  6  • 
It should  be  stressed that  the  failure  of  the EC-inflationary expectations 
variable  to reflect all available  information is not  the  only  reason why 
it performs  poorly in the  supply of  output equations.  This  can be  seen 
from  the fact  taat  the TS-inflationary expectations variable also perfor-
med  poorly in the estimated  supply equation during  the  seventies,  despite 
the fact  that  (with  the  exception of  Belgium)  it was  unrelated  to past 
money  and  foreign price variables. 
6. 
See F.  Mishkin  (1981),  p.  295. T
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VIII. CONCLUSION  AND  POLICY  IMPLICATIONS 
In this study a  supply of output model  was  developed  and  empirically tes-
ted for  six EC-countries  (Belgium.  France,  Germany.  Italy.  Netherlands, 
and  the U.K.)  during  the  sample 9eriod  1960-80. 
In the theoretical part we  focused  on  how  inflationary surprises,  terms 
of  trade changes  and  changes  in taxation of  labor  income  affect  the out-
put  level in the open sector of  the  economy. 
In order to  study  the empirical  importance of  the  inflationary surprise 
variable on the  supply of  output  two  alternative indicators of  inflatio-
nary surprises were  used.  One  indicator is based  on  time  series analysis 
(TS),  the other indicator we  used  is based  on  the EC-inflationary expec-
tations variable as  published by  the EC-Commission.  The.  conclusion of 
this empirical analysis  is that,  at least during  the seventies,  inflatio-
nary surprises  (as  measured either by  the IS-procedure or by  the EC)  were 
insignificant in most  countries.  Tests  of rationality of  these inflatio-
nary expectations data revealed that  in three out  of  six countries  the 
EC-inflationary expectations  series did not pass  the  strong test of ra-
tionality.  We  concluded,  however,  that this is not  the only reason for 
the poor performace of  the EC-series  in the  supply of output  equation,  as 
the IS-inflationary expectations data do  not  perform better despite the 
fact that  (except  in one  country)  they passed  the strong rationality test. 
Finally,  the empirical  evidence  concerning  the role of  terms  of  trade 
changes  on  output  indicates  that especially the  intermediate  (oil)  terms 
of  trade has  had  a  significant negative effect on  output  in most  EC-coun-
tries.  The  theoretically predicted negative effect of  the  tax wedge  va-
riahle was  onlv found  to  be  significant in one  out of six countries during 
the whole  sample period.  There  is evidence,  however,  that since  1973  this 
variable has  had  a  significant negative effect on  output  in three coun-
tries  (Belgium,  the Netherlands  and  the U.K.). - 33  -
\fuat  are the policy implications of  these results  ? 
There are essentially two.  One  is that  the oil induced  supply  shocks  which 
occured during  the  seventies were  aggravated  by  the  simultaneous  and  large 
increase  in the  taxation of  labor during  the  same  period.  Our  results  con-
firm  the results obtained by  others  (Bruno  & Sachs  (1979))  indicating the 
significant negative effect of  the oil shock  on  aggregate output  in European 
countries.  At  the  same  time,  however,  these countries  imposed  on  themselves 
a  "labor tax shock" which  tended  to make  the use of  labor  in the  supply  of 
output  less and  less attractive.  This  negative effect appears  to  have  been 
significant in three of  the six countries  analysed here during  the Seventies. 
Thus  these countries  compounded  the externally generated  supply  shock  by  a 
domestic  one.  The  first  shock  could not  be  avoided,  the  second  shock was  en-
tirely home  made.  The  latter led to  a  decline of  the "natural"  level of out-
put which went  beyond  the one  produced by  the oil shock.  In so  doing it ag-
gravated  the  adjustment  problems  faced  by  these countries  following  the oil 
shock. 
A second  implication of  the results of this  paper  relates to  the determinants 
of  the business  cycle  and  the policies to  follow to stabilize the business 
cycle.  One  important  implication of  the  inflation surprise variable  in ag-
gregate supply equations  is that it provides  a  basis for  a  theory of  the bu-
siness cycle.  This  theory as  developed  by  Lucas  (1975)  and  Barro  (1981)  can 
be  summarized  very briefly as  follows.  Unanticipated monetary  shocks  lead 
to  inflationary surprises.  These  then  lead  through  the  supply of output 
equation,  to variations  in output.  Thus,  the variability of output  can be 
explained by  the unexpected variability of monetary policies.  The  way  to 
stabilize output  then consists  in making  monetary policies more  stable and 
predictible.  The  weak  evidence  about  the output effects of  inflationary 
surprises  found  in this paper casts  doubt  about  this explanation of  the bu-
siness cycle in the European  countries  analyzed here.  They  also cast doubt 
about  the methods  to stabilize output.  The  link between  the  supply of out-
put decisions  and  monetary  shocks  does  not  appear  to be  a  strong one  empi-
rically.  This  also  implies  that stabilization of  the  growth rate of  the 
money  supply is unlikely to be sufficient  (although probably necessary)  to 
stabilize output.  Put differently,  the evidence,  using European data,  is - 34  -
not in favor of  the new  equilibrium theory of the business  cycle,  and  its 
policy preciption which  suggests  that it suffices to stabilize the  growth 
rate of the money  stock in order to stabilize output.  This  does  not mean 
that a  greater stability of monetary policies is not  important or that in-
flation does  not matter.  It suggests  only that the empirical basis of  the 
new  business cycle theory is weak  in the EC-countries  and  that  the tradi-
tional approach  to the stabilization of  the business  cycle,  in particular 
the use of budgetary policies should not be discarted. - 35  -
APPENDIX  A  ESTIMATION  RESULTS 
In this appendix  the  results of estimating equation  (9)  are  reported  and 
interpreted.  Table A.J  presents  the result of estimating rational expec-
tations equations  for  expected  inflation rates  (equation 9).  E~m is  the 
systematic component  of  the  time  series of  changes  of  the money  stock ge-
nerated by  an AR(6).  E~pf and  E~p 0 are  obtained  in a  similar way.  These 
generated series are  interpreted as  the market's expectations of  future 
changes  in the money  stock,  the  foreign price level  (including  the  exchange 
rate)  and  the price of non-traded goods.  The  results confirm what was 
found  by Fratianni & Nabli  (1982)  :  the  expected part of  the  inflation rate 
is mostly unrelated  to money.  The  foreign price variable,  however,  has  a 
more  pronounced  and  significant effect on  expectations  about  inflation. 
The  strongest effect is exerted by  the  systematic  component  of  the  domes-
tic non-traded goods  prices. T
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APPENDIX  C  NOTES  ON  FORECASTING  OF  EXOGENOUS  VARIABLES 
The  exogenous  variables in the model  are 
- money  stock  Ml 
domestic  goods  prices  p 
0 
- exports  X 
- exchange  rate  E  (average of quarter) 
international prices  WPF 
- oil prices  WPHO 
At  this preliminary stage the forecasts  of exogenous  variables used  to 
generate expectations on prices are based  on  single autoregressive 
schemes  of order  6  (AR(6)). 
These  equations are fitted by  OLS  separately for  two  periods 
-up to  1970  only 
- after  1970  only. 
1)  Exchange  rate  :  (for all countries) 
- for  the first period of fixed  exchange  rates,  we  set  ~logE = 0 
- for  the  second period an AR(6)  is used but  in general no  lag is sig-
nificant - so  the  series is essentially white noise. 
2)  World  prices  :  WPF 
3) 
4) 
- for  the first period  the series is almost flat,  and  no  coefficients 
are  significant,  so we  take  ~log WPF  = 0. 
for  the  second period  :  the regression does not yield significant 
coefficients,  but we  use AR(6}. 
Oil prices  :  WPHO 
We  suppose it is white noise,  changes  in oil prices are unpredictable. 
For M1,  p 
o'  and  X in general,  AR(6)  equations yield significant eoeffi-
cients, but only for  some  of  the  lags. - 40  -
We  obtained  the  following AR-models  for  forecasting exogenous  variables 
BELGIUM 
~~!:!~~-!  Period  2  --------
f1ml  AR( I,  4)  f1ml  AR(4) 
l1p 
0  AR(2)  l1p 
0  AR( I,  2) 
f1x  AR(l,  4)  f1x  AR(4,  5) 
f1e  W.N. 
GERMANY 
Period  I  Period  2  -------- --------
f1ml  AR(2,3,4,6)  f1ml  AR(3,4,5,6) 
l1p 
0  AR(2)  l1p 
0  AR(1,2,3) 
f1x  AR(l ,2,4)  f1x  AR(I,3) 
f1e  W.N. 
FRANCE 
Period  Period  2  -------- --------
f1ml  AR(4)  ~ml  AR(l ,2,3,4) 
l1p 
0  AR(l, 2)  l1p 
0  AR(3,4) 
f1x  AR(l ,2,4,5,6)  f1x  AR(3,4,5,6) 
f1e  AR( 1) 
ITALY 
Period  ~~!:!~~-~  --------
f1ml  AR(2,3,4,5,6)  f1ml  AR(3,4,5,6) 
f1p  W.N.  f1po  W.N. 
0 
f1x  f1x  AR(l) 
f1e  W.N. - 41  -
NETHERLANDS 
~~!!~2_!  Period 2  --------
~ml  AR(l ,3,4)  ~ml  AR(3,4,5,6) 
~p  W.N.  ~p  AR(2,4)  0  0 
~X  AR(l ,2,3,4)  ~X  W.N. 
~e  W.N. - 42  -
APPENDIX  D  EXPLORING  LAG  STRUCTURES  IN  THE  SUPPLY  OF  OUTPUT  FUNCTION 
In the initial phase a  common  lag structure is used  for all countries based 
on  a  Koyck  lag by  introducing the  lagged  dependent variable.  This  assumes 
that the lag structure is the  same  for all explanatory variables. 
Some  results are available showing  the sensitivity of  the estimates  to 
this assumption.  For  this purpose  the basic supply  equation with tax 
wedge  is used here  and  estimated for  the whole  period. 
The  findings  for  the various  countries  show  improvement  for  Belgium and 
Germany. 
For Belgium  a  two-period  lag on  the  intermediate  terms  of  trade  improves 
the fit significantly.  For Germany,  a  polynomial  lag of  degree  2  on  un-
expected  inflation improves  the equation significantly, with three lags 
on  that variable positive and  significant.  A peculiar result,  however, 
is the strong negative  impact  of  the  (p
0
- pd)  variable  (as  expected), 
but  then a  strong positive effect for  the  twice  lagged variable. 
For  the Netherlands  the  improvement  of  the results is less significant, 
and  shows  a  stronger effect of  the oil terms  of  trade with a  lag up  to 
four  periods. 
For France a  one-period  lag on  fiscal terms-of-trade and  {p
0 
- pd)  impro-
ves  the results slightly.  And  for  the UK,  a  polynomal  lag of  degree  2 
on  unexpected  inflation yields significant positive effects for  the first 
two  periods  and  negative coefficients for  the following  three periods. 
For the  {p
0 
- pd)  variable the polynomal  lag  shows  a  weak  negative  impact 
for  the first two  periods,  and  strong positive effects contrary to  the 
theory for  lags  3  and  4  (as  for  Germany). 
Finally for  Italy alternative lag structures do  not yield any  better re-
sults for a  model  which  does  not  seem  to fit Italian data well. - 43  -
The  overall evidence is that when  the model  has  a  good  explanatory power, 
it is possible  to  improve  on it by  searching for better lag structures 
(Belgium,  Germany),  while when  the model  does  not fit the data well  no 
improvement  can be achieved  looking for alternative lag structures  (Italy). - 44  -
Table A.2  Supply of output equations 
Belgium 
y  = -0.084  +  0.0003  t  - 0.031  T  +  0.333(~p-E~p)  +  0.383(pd-pf) 
(0.28)  (3.89)  (0.72)  (0.63)  (3.64) 
- 0.0475(ph-pf)-2  - 0.349(p  -pd)  +  0.487  y_1 
(4.45)  (2.19) 
0  (4.53) 
SE  =  0.023 
y  = -0.435  +  0.0006  t  - 0.023 T  +  0.465(~p-E~p)  +  0.588(pd-pf) 
(1.30)  (17.1)  (0.47)  (0.76)  (5.37) 
- 0.080(ph-pf)_2  - 0.883(p  -pd) 
(8.86)  (7.18) 
0 
SE  = 0.026 
y  = -0.206  +  0.003  - 0.061  T_1  +  0.265(~p-E~p)  +  0.384(pd-pf) 
(0.71)  (4.09)  (1.43)  (0.50)  (3.70) 
- 0.0468(ph-pf)-2  - 0.349(p  -pd)  +  0.474  y_1 
(4.50)  (2.22) 
0  (4.47) 
SE  = 0.022 
Germany 
y  = 2.217  +  0.00028 t- 0.178 T  +  1.378(~p-E~p)  +  1.402(~p-E~p)_ 1  (5.98)  (7.28)  (2.66)  (1.56)  (2.81) 
+  1.088(~p-E~p)_ 2  +  0.436(~p-E~p)_ 3  +  0.060(pd-pf)- 0.005(ph-pf)_1  (1.741)  (0.93)  (0.69)  (0.29) 
- 0.436(p  -pd)  +  ).172(p  -pd)-2 
(2.21) 
0  (6.37) 
0 
-2  R  = 0.98 
SE  = 0.028 - 45  -
Netherlands 
y  = 0.0155  +  0.0005 t- 0.287{~p-E~p)  - 0.161{pd-pf)  - O.I02{ph-pf) 
(0.03)  (8.92)  (0.42)  (1.08)  (3.83) 
- 0.018{ph-pf)_1  +  0.013{ph-pf)_2  - 0.005(ph-pf)_3  - 0.075{ph-pf)_4  (1.406)  (0.57)  (0.44)  (2.72) 
- O.Ol4{p  -pd) 
(0.06) 
0 
y  = -0.295  +  0.00018  +  0.321{~p-E~p)  - 0.081{pd-pf)  - 0.052{ph-pf) 
(0.92)  (3.22)  (0.71)  (0.83)  (2.89) 
- 0.226{p  -pd)  +  0.756  y_1 
(1.42) 
0  (8.90) 
France 
y  = 0.0048  +  0.00024  t  - 0.021 T  +  0.329{~p-E~p)  +  0.064(pd-pf) 
(0.021)  (0.51)  (0.51)  (0.40)  (0.62) 
- 0.045{ph-pf)-l  - 0.134{p  -pd)_1  +  0.572  y_1  (2.50)  (1.00) 
0  (4.45)  SE  = 0.033 
y  = -0.203  +  0.006  t  - 0.062  T +  0.088{~p-E~p)  +  0.203{pd-pf)_1 
(0.70)  (20.62)  (1.24)  (0.09)  (1.68)  \ 
SE  = 0.039 - 46  -
U.K. 
y  = 4.156  ~·  0.0001 t- 0.167  T+  0.551(~p-E~p)  +  0.263(~p-E~p)_ 1  (11.83)  (3.60)  (1.71)  (1.513)  (1.477) 
- 0.043(~p-E~p)_ 2
- 0.369(~p-E~p)_ 3
- 0.714(~p-E~p)_4  +  0.0453(pd-pf) 
(0.17)  (2.04)  (1.95)  (1.38) 
+  0.112{p  -pd)_2  +  0.386{p -pd)_3  +  0.638(p  -pd)_4  (0.90) 
0  (3.28) 
0  (2.44) 
0 
SE  = 0.032 - 47  -
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